LEGAL NOTES.
That a mortgagee has taken possession
of the mortgaged premises, does not prevent his foreclosing the mortgage thereon
afterwards, Portland Bank v. Box, 19
Me. 99; Harkins v. Forsyth, 11 Leigh
294 ; or recovering the balance due on
the mortgage debt, Budge v. Rihens, L.
R., 8 C. '. 358; Porter v. Pillsbury, 36
Me. 278 ; Weiner v. lleintz, 17 Ill. 259;
Andrews v. Scotton, 2 Bland 668;
Amory v. rairbanks, 3 Mass. 562;
Hatch v. White, 2 Gall. 152 ; Lovell v.
Leland, 3 Vt. 581 ; see Green v. Cross,
45 N. 11.574; Biygins v. Brockman, 63
Ini. 316 ; Johnson v. Lewis, 13 Minn.
364 ; or purchasing under his own judgment, Trmant v. M31arsh, 54 N. Y. 599 ;
or taking the body of the defendant, on a
ca. so. for the mortgage debt, Colby Y.
Gibson, 3 Smith (K. B.) 516 ; see Alaguire v. O'Reilly, 3 Jon. & Lat. 224.
As to the effect of a mortgagee purchasing the equity of redemption under
the execution sale of another creditor of
the mortgagor, hfurphy v. Elliott, 6
Blackf. 482 ; Crawford v. Boyer, 14 Pa.
St. 380; Ex parte City Sheriff, I MeCord 399 ; Schnell v. Schroder, Bail.
Eq. 334; Trimmier v. Vise, 17 S. C.
499 ; Barnes v. Brown, 71 N. C. 507;
see Cross v. Stahlman, 43 Pa. St. 129.
A statute authorizing an equity of redemption to be sold under execution at
law, was held not to include a judgment
obtained by the mortgagee, on his bond,
and a sale of the premises thereunder to
himself, Shaw v. Tims, 19 Grant's Ch.

496 ; Kerr v. Styles, 26 Id. 309 ; see
annooman v. 31Carty, 20 U. C. C. P.
42; also Preston Y. Ryan., 45 Mich. 174.
As to the right of a purchaser of the
premises from the mortgagor to have a
personal judgment against the mortgagor
for the debt transferred to him on his
redeeming the mortgage, Greenougl v.
Littler, L. R., 15 Ch. Div. 93 ; and
similar rights of the mortgagor's sureties
on the bond, Stewart v. Clark, 13 U. C.
C. P. 203 ; Post v. Tradesinens' Bank,
28 Conn. 420 ; Darst v. Bates, 95 IIl.
493; Cullum v. Emanuel, 1 Ala. 23 ;
3iller v. 3iussehnan, 6 Whart. 354;
Brew'er v. Staples, 3 Sandf. Ch. 579;
Lowndes v. Chisholm, McCord's 455;
Bronston v. Robinson, 4 B. Mon. 142.
A vendor may enforce his lien against
a purchaser of the premises under an
execution issued on a judgment at law
recovered by the vendor on his bond,
Rice v. Wilburn, 31 Ark. 108 ; Murphy
v. Elliott, 6 Blackf. 482; see Barker v.
Smark, 3 Beav. 64; Greeno v. Barnard,
18 Kan. 518.
As to the jurisdiction of equity to
relieve in case of mistake as to the effect
of a purchase at a sheriff's sale on the
lien of a mortgage on premises, Cumming's Appeal, 23 Pa. St. 509 ; Biggins
v. Broc Tnan, 63 I1. 316; Lowndes v.
Chisholm, 2 McCord's Ch. 455.
The case of Cattel v. Warwick, I Hal.
190, seems to have been doubted in
Sloan v. Surmners, 2 Gr. 515.
Jon H. STEWART.

LEGAL NOTES.
Two decisions have lately been rendered on the question of the
constitutionality of statutes regulating railroad traffic. The opinions are
too long for publication in full, but the following abstracts may be of
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interest in connection with Mr. Savage's article in the February number
of the Register, and Mr. Hamilton's article in the present number.
The first of these decisions was rendered February 29th 1884, in the
United States Circuit Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, in the
cases of Louisville & N. Railroad Co. v. Railroad Commission of Tennessee, and East Tennessee V. & G. Railroad Co. v. The Same. The
Legislature of Tennessee had on March 30th 1883, passed an act to establish a railroad commission. The first section declared that every railroad in the state was a public highway, over which all persons had
equal rights of transportation on payment of just and reasonable
compensation, and provided that any person or corporation, who should
exact more than a just and reasonable compensation, or make an unjust
or unreasonable discrimination, should be guilty of extortion, and that
the question whether the compensation was reasonable, or the discrimination unjust should be determined by the jury.
The other sections of the act provided that the party injured should
have the right to recover ten times the damage sustained, and a reasonable counsel fee, unless the rates charged were such as bad been
approved by the railroad commission, in which case only actual damages
should be recoverable; that it should be the duty of the railroad commission, whenever the provisions of the act were violated, to cause suits
to be entered in the name of the State, in which certain pecuniary penalties should be recoverable; that the Governor should nominate three
railroad commissioners, who should revise all tariffs of charges, and fix
and approve the rates decided by them to be reasonable, and that their
approval should, in suits brought under the act, beprimafacieevidence,
that the charges were reasonable, and that charges greater than their
rates should be primaface extortionate. The act contained a saving
clause to the effect that no rate should be considered extortionate if it
appeared from the evidence that the net earnings of the railroad .transporting freight, if done without such discrimination on the basis of such
rate, together with the net earnings from passenger and other traffic
would not amount to more than a fair and just return on the assessed
value of the railroad, and that the act should not apply to any railroad
then being constructed or which might thereafter be constructed until
ten years after the completion of such railroad.
The act further contained a number of regulations for the work of the
commissioners, amongwhich was a provision that it should be their duty to
confer with the commissioners of other states and with such persons in
states having no commissioners as the governor of such states might
appoint, for the purpose of agreeing upon a draft of statutes to be submitted to the legislature of each state to secure uniform control of railroad transportation in the several states and from one state into or
through anotner.
The Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and The East Tennessee V. & G. Railroad Company filed bills to enjoin the commissioners,
appointed under this act from revising the freight tariff.
These bills set forth that the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company was a Kentucky corporation, and was authorized by license of the
laws of Tennessee to extend its road into that state, and subsequently,
by laws passed for the purpose, to consolidate with other railroad companies and thereby became an extensive system of intercommunication
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between the states from the Ohio River to the Gulf of MIexico ; that the
East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Railroad Company was a Tennessee corporation, and by authority of law became a consolidated corporation operating a system of railroads between the states and extending through Tennessee into Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi, forming
with its connections a united line of inter-communication, traversing
North and South Carolina, Virginia and other states; and that defendants had notified complainants that they would proceed to revise all the
tariffs of freight within the state of Tennessee. Defendants by affidavits asserted the validity of the statute. After hearing the court
granted the injunction.
Judge BAXTER in his opinion concedes the right of the legislature to
protect the public by reasonable regulations against unjust discrimination by railroads, but holds that " the rules prescribed and the power
exerted must be within the police power in fact and not covert amnendments to their charters in curtailment of their corporate franchises."
He further finds that inasmuch as the act gives to each jury the right
to determine the whole question as to the proper rate to be charged
without fixing a definite or certain standard, the statute was illegal as
subjecting the corporations to actions for penalties quasi criminal, under
provisions so vague and indefinite that the corporation could not regulate
its business with reasonable safety, and that the statute in certain of its
provisions discriminated between persons and corporations in violation
of a clause of the Tennessee constitution prohibiting discrimination in
the granting of rights and privileges, and was also in violation of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, prohibiting
the states from depriving any person of life, liberty or property without
law.
due process of
Judge HAMMOND in an elaborate opinion, after a review of the authorities, holds the statute unconstitutional as being an attempted regulation of commerce. The general principles on which he bases his
opinion are concisely stated in his syllabus, as follows:
"The power of the states to regulate railroad rates by direct action is
limited to domestic transportation, which means that carried on exclusively within the boundaries of- a state, and transportation can be
domestic only when it begins and ends within those boundaries; and
this definition cannot, for the purpose of enlarging state authority, be
held to include so much of a transportation on a continuous shipment
between two or more states as will cover the distance travelled within
the limits of any one of those states ; for this construction would
utterly destroy the exclusive power of Congress over the inter-state
transportation, abrogate the constitutional provision and enable the states
to restrict, obstruct or impair that freedom of commerce between the
states which it was the object of the provision to permanently secure.
It can only include the transportation carried on upon roads lying wholly
within the state, or else, it may be, to shipments beginning and ending
in the state without reference to the character of the road in that regard.
This is the utmost reach of state power, and as to this, no decision is
now made, because the act itself makes no discrimination, and attempts
to control all rates."
'cUntil Congress chooses to exercise whatever power it may have over
domestic commerce, as above described, by reason of whatever relation
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it may bear to inter-state commerce as an auxiliary or instrumentality
thereof, the statps may continue their control over it as over any other
such instrumentality within their territorial limits, although the interstate commerce of which it is an instrumentality may be indirectly or
incidentally affected by such control, but they can never touch the interstate commerce itself by direct action upon it or any part of it, by these
regulations, and any state law, be it wise or unwise, valid or invalid in
other respects, and no matter what its character or the necessity for such
a law may be, which acts upon the contracts for inter-state transportation between the carrier and shipper, to regulate the charges for it, or
any part of it, or the conditions thereof in any respect, operates directly
on the commerce itself, of which the transportation is certainly a part
and not an instrumentality of it. These distinctions must be observed
in legislation, and that which neglects or overlooks them, or assumes to
disregard them, is necessarily invalid. And the courts cannot cure the
defect by supplying through judicial decree the necessary qualifications to conform the legislation to constitutional limitation"
"It is as impossible for a state to make a regulation of inter-state
commerce by the exercise of its power over the corporations of its creation, as by any other power, if it permits them to engage in inter-state
commerce. Possibly, it may bind the corporations permitted to engage
in inter-state commerce to schedules of rates agreed upon by them; but
this is binding only by force of the contract of the carrier to be so
bound and not as a regulation of the rates under any municipal power
of the state over the commerce. A regulation of inter-state commerce
as such is as invalid in a charter as elsewhere in a state statute."
The conclusion which Judge HAM IIOND reaches from these principles
is as follows:
"We hold without tAe least hesitation after this examination of' the
subject that an act of the legislature which attempts as this does, to
regulate, no matter how, all transportation over the railroads in this
state, and to revise all tariffs of charges for transportation over those
roads is, so far as it relates to the plaintiffs in these cases before us, an
attempt to control the compensation to be charged by them for the
transportation of commodities and persons in transit between two or
more states for that portion of the route lying within this state, and
therefore invalid as a regulation of inter-state commerce acting as it
does in the most direct way possible on that commerce itself. This act
makes no discrimination whatever in this regard, and we cannot by
judicial action insert them in the act by limiting our injunction in respeat of the interference of the defendants with the charges by plaintiffs for fares and freights in any way. This would be to legislate by
judicial decree, for there is nothing in the act to guide us in fixing our
limitations. It does not appear that the legislature would have passed
this law or any law confining its powers as we have suggested. * * *
Hence we must take the statute as we'find it and restrain the defendants
from any action under it as to these plaintiffs."
The second decision was rendered in May 1884, in the United States
Circuit Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, in the case of
The Illinois Central Railroad Company against Stone et al., Commissioners. The legislature of Mississippi had on March 11th 1884, passed

